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Manchester University  
Jacques Rancière and Jürgen Habermas share several important 
commitments.* They both strongly support democracy and equality, focus 
significant parts of their work on understanding the role of communication in 
politics, and reject pessimistic defeatism about political action.1 Their work 
arises from different traditions—Rancière’s thought emerges from 
engagement with the work of French Marxists like Althusser, while Habermas’s 
theories respond to and redirect the work of early Frankfurt School critical 
social theory. Each has a somewhat similar role in these traditions: 
championing democracy in the wake of thinkers who paid much less attention 
to that ideal.  
Nonetheless, Rancière is a critic of Habermas, articulating his democratic 
vision in opposition to elements of Habermas’s approach. They interpret 
various core concepts differently, apparently viewing politics, democracy, 
communication, and disagreement in conflicting ways. Because the nature and 
basis of their differences are not always clear, it is worth trying to sort out 
where they stand in relation to one another. While some have viewed Rancière 
as offering a trenchant challenge to Habermas, I will contend that Rancière’s 
critique is less compelling than some have thought. 
Rancière views democratic politics as emerging from contexts where 
excluded people are given orders, marginalized, or otherwise treated as 
subordinates. Democracy emerges when those who are excluded revolt 
against established social frameworks—what he calls the “police order”—that 
exclude them. Such social orders have a fundamentally aesthetic character that 
structures the sensibilities of those within them. On Rancière’s conception, 
such social orderings determine how the world appears to people, as well as 
shaping how individuals understand themselves and others. In democratic 
politics, Rancière thinks that the excluded must challenge and reconfigure this 
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sensible ordering of things in order to establish themselves as equals. Political 
action is about resisting and contesting the status quo in order to appear as 
an equal in public life. 
This understanding of politics is supposed to present a problem for 
Habermas’s discourse theory of democracy. Critics contend that he cannot 
account for the dynamics of command, exclusion, resistance, and aesthetic 
transformation involved in Rancière’s understanding of politics. In particular, 
the prominent roles Habermas affords to communicative rationality and 
consensus have led people to think that he cannot grasp the radical forms of 
political disagreement Rancière describes. 
Habermas’s views are subtler than many have appreciated, however. In 
this paper, I defend Habermas against the main objections Rancière presents 
against him in Disagreement. While there are genuine differences between 
their views, a Habermasian understanding of third-person speech and 
aesthetic expression is nuanced and adaptable enough to evade Rancière’s 
criticisms. I conclude by suggesting that Habermasian theorists have also 
developed crucial forms of social and political critique that Rancière’s theory 
systematically excludes. 
Habermas on Disagreement and Democracy 
In Rancière’s now-classic text, Disagreement, the third chapter is 
dedicated to formulating a new conception of political disagreement—one 
that departs from the Habermasian view. Before looking at how Rancière 
expresses his critique of Habermas’s position, we must consider Habermas’s 
understandings of rationality, disagreement, and democratic politics. 
In the very beginning of his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas 
notes that rationality has to do “with how speaking and acting subjects acquire 
and use knowledge.”2 Famously, Habermas distinguishes this acquisition and 
use of knowledge into the categories of communicative rationality and 
instrumental rationality. The instrumental sort is when an “actor satisfies the 
conditions necessary for realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the 
world.”3 In contrast to such non-communicative, goal-oriented activity, 
communicative rationality involves claims meant to achieve consensus 
through argument and justification. In delineating these varieties of rationality, 
he argues that communicative rationality is not reducible to instrumental 
rationality. 
In this context, I will be most concerned with communicative rationality. 
When validity claims are put forward (explicitly or implicitly in action or 
speech), they must be grounded in reasons that can be offered to all others in 
a practice of argumentation. These validity claims are the knowledge at issue. 
Habermas thinks they are redeemed via intersubjective justification in three 
different ways: in relation to the objective world, the intersubjective world of 
norms, or the behavior and subjective experiences of the self. When I claim 
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someone is trustworthy, for instance, this speech act is only communicatively 
rational if, in making it, I am capable of acknowledging its fallibility and 
defending it in argument (i.e., she’s never let me down, she is truthful, etc.). As 
Rancière will discuss, Habermas views the goal of such communicative speech 
acts as reaching mutual understanding. These speech acts’ telos is having their 
meaning understood and their validity recognized by the hearer. To grasp the 
meaning of a sentence, according to Habermas, is to grasp the conditions 
under which “we know what makes it acceptable.”4 When people disagree, 
then, they dispute whether a claim is valid or not, offering support for their 
contention that it ought to be accepted. The aim of this practice is to convince 
interlocuters to come to a mutual understanding about the validity of the 
speaker’s claim. 
 This practice of communication implicitly relies on a counterfactual, 
ideal speech situation, one free of coercion, where the participants are 
symmetrical and properly motivated, and where any possible content offered 
may be questioned and criticized. These constraining aspects of the situation 
presupposed by communicative rationality arise out of the illocutionary goal 
of mutual understanding that Habermas finds in speech acts. Insofar as 
justification through argumentation aims at such understanding, certain 
conditions can undermine the communicative goal of speech. Under 
conditions of coercion or domination, those who communicate do not achieve 
mutual understanding, but one side’s capitulation. Also, since this process is 
justificatory and hence evaluative, it occurs within the participant perspective, 
not the objectifying, third-person point of view, where the force of such 
reasons cannot be recognized.5 These constraints, which are deeply bound up 
with our everyday use of language, are what constitute communicative 
rationality. To ignore these criteria of intersubjective justification, Habermas 
thinks, is to be in a performative contradiction, which undermines the 
presuppositions of one’s own speech acts. A speaker cannot—without 
contradiction—seek mutual understanding while undermining the conditions 
of possibility for such understanding. 
 For Habermas, these forms of communication rely on what he calls, 
following Husserl, the lifeworld. Behind the thematized justification of validity 
claims, there is “an unthematically concurrent, relatively foregrounded 
knowledge on which the participants rely in the form of pragmatic and 
semantic presuppositions.”6 This knowledge does not get problematized in 
communication; some things are just assumed in communication as shared 
interpretations or milieus. For instance, when someone asks me for directions 
on the street, I will not, under normal circumstances, wonder whether the 
person speaking is actually an android replicant. I will also not interpret the 
noises they make as the recitation of lines from a play they believe themselves 
to be performing. If I were to constantly have such worries (and to demand 
justification accordingly), participating in everyday life would become difficult, 
if not impossible. We all rely on something like a lifeworld in order to get by. 
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Nonetheless, such knowledge must still be possible to question and criticize. 
It “easily gets drawn into the maelstrom of problematization,” as Habermas 
reminds us.7 That is, if someone starts making beeping noises and their eyes 
glow red, or I notice they keep glancing down at a script, my prior 
presumptions about the background of our speech situation will be 
destabilized. 
 This picture of communicative rationality ultimately serves a broader 
conception of democratic politics in Habermas’s theory—his procedural, 
discourse theory. This influential political philosophy forms one of the key 
theoretical foundations of the ideal of deliberative democracy. In order to 
overcome depoliticized administrative steering systems (e.g., bureaucracy, 
markets), Habermas attempts to envision a politics centered on autonomy, 
self-realization, and popular sovereignty. He thinks of public and private 
autonomy as co-original, as the human rights that constitute the basis of a 
procedure of popular will-formation. The reason Habermas thinks of popular 
sovereignty as a procedure is that it allows him to avoid undermining the 
validity of actual democratic deliberation with a metaphysical conception of 
reason. If popular sovereignty were given too substantive a theoretical 
grounding, it might be tempting to take a concrete concept of justice, the 
good, or whatever else, and institute it via administrative expertise. Instead, 
through democratic, discursive procedures, we might understand majority 
decisions “as the rationally motivated but fallible result of an attempt to 
determine what is right through a discussion that has been brought to a 
provisional close.”8 Given a vibrant public sphere that permeates legislative 
institutions, there arises communicative power, backed by the communicative 
rationality Habermas describes, which is collectively binding. This power is 
operationalized in law, however, which provides “a stabilization of behavioral 
expectations.” Both sides of the equation require each other, according to 
Habermas: “law requires a normative perspective [i.e., communication and 
procedural democracy], and power an instrumental one.”9 Much more could 
be said about Habermas’s quite detailed and complex view, but at its heart it 
attempts to connect democracy and law inextricably together, while theorizing 
a popular will free of the problems plaguing many classical viewpoints. 
Rancière on Disagreement and Democracy 
Rancière’s own conceptions of communication, disagreement, and 
democratic politics differ from Habermas’s. Although Rancière only directly 
cites or mentions Habermas a few times, his presence can be felt behind much 
of what Rancière discusses in “The Rationality of Disagreement,” the third 
chapter of Disagreement. He presents his conception of the logic of politics in 
order to get around what he sees as a false alternative between “rational 
communication . . . [and] irreducible difference.”10 For Rancière, politics is not 
those within a shared community deliberating about various decisions, nor is 
it reducible to straightforward struggles to control various forms of power. 
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Political rationality is about exposing and contesting the division and 
distribution of social roles constituted by what Rancière calls the “police.” He 
describes the police as follows: 
an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways 
of being, and ways of seeing, and sees that those bodies are assigned 
by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and 
the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is 
not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as 
noise.11 
This police order defines social roles and occupations and organizes them 
into a hierarchical structure that makes some actors perceptible and others 
not. It determines what roles and activities people are qualified to participate 
in and is inscribed in the public perception of social life.12 Crucially, this 
ordering presents itself as complete, as excluding no one. It defines some as 
competent, particularly as competent to rule over others who are depicted as 
lacking qualification to rule and, as such, are unequal. This differentiation of 
individuals based on intelligence and competence is reflected in cases where, 
for instance, laborers are depicted as capable only of certain manual work but 
incompetent for taking part in important social decision-making.13 
Politics opposes this logic, challenging the hierarchy of the police order, 
as well its claim to completeness. On Rancière’s view, politics rejects the 
existence of some commonly understood world, corresponding to the one 
supposed by the oligoï who define some as less worthy or competent. 
Rejecting this false totality, political action exposes a partition between the 
world as defined by the police order and the world as understood by those 
not afforded a place in the police’s ordering of occupations and social spaces. 
Politics manifests a conflict or disagreement in order to reconfigure “the 
partition of the perceptible,” the sensible ordering of bodies that excludes 
some, rendering their competence and intelligence invisible.14 While the 
police’s depiction of the world make some imperceptible, politics contests the 
divisions that this order obscures by exposing a competing, egalitarian sense 
of the world. In situations of political disagreement, a partial community 
asserts itself and challenges the current setup of the whole, aiming to redefine 
the exclusionary situation. It asserts itself as an egalitarian order, a “singular, 
polemical universality of a demonstration,” aimed at uprooting the 
inegalitarian police order that claims a false universality, one that excludes 
those who issue the polemical call for equality.15 In these political moments, 
new, shared ways of sensing the world and new forms of subjectivity will 
emerge, rejecting the identifications of the police order. He points to cases of 
pedagogues whose approach to teaching is based on the assumption that all 
are equally intelligent, and women who present themselves as candidates for 
office despite being legally excluded from doing so.16 For Rancière, these acts 
are aesthetic and argumentative, occurring largely outside the normalized 
situation of rational communication that he finds in Habermas. 
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Rancière’s Critique of Habermas 
 In the process of developing this picture of political disagreement, 
Rancière raises several objections to Habermas. First, Rancière thinks that 
Habermas will attack genuine political action as a violation of the 
communicative rationality that should ideally shape democratic politics. 
Second, he thinks that Habermas mischaracterizes communication between 
unequal parties, in particular his discussion of performative contradictions. 
Finally, Rancière accuses Habermas’s theory of rational communicative action 
of downplaying the importance of aesthetic, world-disclosing language in 
politics. I will take up and dispute each of these criticisms in the sections that 
follow. 
Politics, Communication, and the Third-Person Standpoint 
 A central theme of Habermas’s philosophy is the importance of the 
participant standpoint in the interpretation of intersubjective communication. 
Part of our ability to understand one another comes from taking first- and 
second-person standpoints with respect to validity claims expressed in 
communication. To identify something as a reason requires, Habermas thinks, 
taking a stance on its possible validity.  
Rancière comprehends this aspect of Habermas’s theory as in tension 
with central aspects of genuine politics. In Rancière’s view, Habermas depicts 
politics as a “meeting of partners who hear an utterance, immediately 
understand the act that caused it to be uttered, and take on board the 
intersubjective relationship that supports this understanding.”17 This last 
element of the picture Rancière attributes to Habermas is what raises a special 
concern, insofar as Rancière believes politics is specifically calling the police 
order underlying social life into question. To put this order’s established 
relationships (boss/worker, man/woman, master/slave, etc.) into question, a 
third-person stance is called for, on his view. This stance presumes a universal 
equality and rejects the social partitions that make up the background of 
decision-making. This third-person attempt at challenging “the police” is the 
essence of politics, he thinks. 
 The question, in considering this challenge, is whether Habermas can 
make room for the political situation as Rancière describes it or whether his 
view is impoverished in this respect. Perhaps Habermas will view challenges to 
“the police” as strategic, instrumental action, rather than the kind of 
communicative, deliberative democracy he supports.  
For Rancière, political events involve responding to “police logic” that 
divides society up, excluding some in the process. On the basis of such logic, 
various roles, presumably including forms of authority, get defined. Politics is 
when those who are excluded from this partitioning of social reality break with 
police logic, contradicting its definitions and orders on the basis of equality. A 
person can distance themselves from that logic and take a third-person, critical 
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stance rather than accepting this order. In politics, “the position of the 
enunciator [is made] explicit” in order to construct a new relationship within 
the given scene. “The utterance thereby completed then finds itself extracted 
from the speech situation in which it functioned naturally,” Rancière explains, 
“It is placed in another situation in which it no longer works, in which it is the 
object of scrutiny, reduced to the status of an utterance in a common 
language.”18 This sort of demonstration seems to be how Rancière conceives 
political disagreement. It breaks out of a discourse that demands compliance 
and affirmation, objectifying the superior’s speech acts and subjecting them 
to scrutiny through polemic. In a monological key, the hearer forces a 
“consideration of speaking beings as such” by commenting on the lack of a 
common stage for discourse.19 This demonstration or formation of public 
opinion anticipates a forum for debate between equals that does not yet exist. 
Third-person speech objectifies the superior’s police logic, meaning that it 
examines the police order from the outside as an object of critique, rather than 
as something to participate in. In many of the cases Rancière discusses, a kind 
of contempt is present in the use of third-person speech, indicating a situation 
that prevents direct discourse as equals.20 Perhaps a worker sarcastically 
comments, “The boss calls the shots at the factory, but the workers might 
decide not to show up.” Indirect commentary is a refusal to accept the police 
logic structuring the unequal terms of the disagreement. On Rancière’s view, 
this commentary foregrounds a divided interpretation of the speech situation 
itself, contesting police logic by attempting to construct an alternative, 
egalitarian world where the marginalized count as equals. 
Rancière thinks Habermas misconstrues third-person speech and that his 
criticisms of the third-person perspective lock “the rational argument of 
political debate into the same speech situation as the one it seeks to 
overcome: the simple rationality of a dialogue of interests.”21 Rancière worries 
that Habermas’s insistence on taking the perspective of a participant 
forecloses the possibility of removing oneself from police logic by objectifying 
and attacking the situation it assumes. We are forced into discourse on unjust 
terms, assuming—without examination—a background police logic that 
dictates various roles and creates an exclusionary normative order.  
Nothing Habermas says excludes the possibility of resisting the 
domination of such police logic, nor does his viewpoint constitute a rejection 
of the third-person commentaries Rancière references. Even if we take 
Rancière’s view of politics for granted, he misunderstands Habermas’s critique 
of the third-person standpoint, leading him to wrongly suggest Habermas 
cannot capture “the political,” in Rancière’s sense. In The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, the sole text of Habermas’s that Rancière cites in 
Disagreement, Habermas does not suggest the third-person perspective 
cannot be used or that it is an objectionable grammatical form. Instead, 
Habermas believes that we can only have discourse about “the structures of 
the lifeworld in general, and not [about] determinate lifeworlds in their 
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concrete historical configurations.”22 That is, we cannot adopt a third-person 
perspective that removes us from the totality of our historical and social 
commitments and presuppositions.23 There is no getting completely outside 
of the lifeworld in one fell swoop, given that the perspective from which we 
criticize our lifeworld is constituted within it (in addition to constituting and 
reproducing that lifeworld). That, of course, should not prevent reflective 
critique of its structures and norms. In fact, a long tradition of critical theory—
of which Habermas is a part—relies on just this method of immanent critique. 
Habermas makes this point clearly, arguing that reflective critique’s “liberating 
force is directed toward single illuminations: It cannot make transparent the 
totality […] of a collective way of life.”24 Habermas’s worry is that taking the 
third-person point of view should not delude us into thinking we have 
eschewed all the presuppositions we share with others, adopting an objective, 
detached singular standpoint. This hermeneutic approach suggests that social 
critique emerges within particular social orders, but can still reflect on an order 
while critiquing and opposing specific elements of it. 
Nothing Habermas says suggests such critiques cannot be expressed in 
the third person in political practice, as it is in my example of the worker’s 
comments or in the labor manifestos from which Rancière draws important 
aspects of his picture of politics. Using the third-person to comment on one’s 
exclusion does not suggest that one shares no background agreement with 
one’s audience. Nor does commenting in the third person mean claiming a 
perspective outside of shared social reality. Perhaps Rancière does not intend 
to claim that those engaged in politics take such a perspective. If so, then 
Habermas’s picture of things can incorporate the political activity Rancière 
discusses, even if he may interpret its character differently. If, alternatively, 
Rancière views political speech as involving some sort of extra-social 
standpoint, then he will be adopting a highly implausible commitment into his 
understanding of politics.  
Centrally, Rancière seems to want to indicate that the non-recognition of 
some individuals as capable of speech—as equal—means they are denied a 
form of status such that they are placed outside the police logic and discourse 
against which they opine. They are placed outside the world of 
communicative, equal beings. In light of that exclusion, Habermas would view 
objectifying, third-person commentary as reactive and corrective. The original 
communicative sin is on the side of bosses who ignore workers’ 
communicative agency, for example. Putting forward such a manifesto—in the 
third person or not—also seems quite oriented toward mutual understanding. 
The workers make a claim against their oppressors in order to challenge and 
ultimately reshape the lifeworld. In doing so, they cannot reject it in its entirety. 
However, they must, in Habermas’s view, concentrate their critique on specific 
elements of the police logic that excludes them. 
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Understanding and Equality 
An additional objection Rancière lodges against the Habermasian view 
has to do with how exactly to interpret “understanding.” Rancière challenges 
the idea that speech acts are oriented towards mutual understanding—a core 
aspect of Habermas’s view. Rancière thinks that understanding can be 
interpreted in two ways: on the one hand as the understanding of a problem 
and on the other as the understanding of an order. Consider a superior 
delivering an order and then asking a subordinate, “Do you understand?” The 
question, Rancière suggests, implicitly requires the hearer either to affirm the 
interrogator’s interpretation of the speech scene as one where they hold 
authority or to admit some kind of incomprehension. The question demands 
that the hearer obey, flouting and mocking any kind of possible questioning 
of its validity. Rancière suggests that attention must be paid to the 
contradictory, unjust nature of the demand for “understanding.” The 
implication is that Habermas’s interpretation of understanding as the goal of 
speech acts obscures cases like this one, where the imposition of control, 
rather than genuine mutual understanding and problem solving, is the point 
of a speech act.  
A closer look at Habermas’s theory demonstrates that he would view the 
case Rancière describes as involving a speaker taking an unjustifiable stance. 
The superior’s question, as presented, implies an interpretation of the lifeworld 
that is beyond criticism, or perhaps even a thematized claim about the shared 
situation that is beyond questioning. In particular, the interpretation of the 
speech situation the speaker presents depicts the hearer as excluded and 
incapable of participating in communication on an equal footing with others. 
The question is premised on the incapacity of the hearer to properly respond. 
Such an incorrigible, subordinating stance clashes with the fallibilism and 
equal standing that Habermas believes rational communication implicitly 
demands. In addition, he would view it as communicatively irrational insofar 
as the questioner refuses to be held accountable for his or her claims by 
avoiding giving reasons for those claims.  
Note, in addition, that the speaker presumably makes some claim before 
asking whether the hearer understands (i.e., “You must press the button! Do 
you understand?”). On Habermas’s view, any prior statement would involve an 
implicit claim to validity. Even if the hearer comprehends the conditions 
necessary for a speech act’s validity, there is no reason to suppose the hearer 
must assume those conditions are fulfilled. The situation Rancière describes is 
clearly a violation of what Habermas understands to be the requirements of 
rationality on the part of the so-called superior. Habermas’s conception of 
communication provides no space for demands for unquestioning obedience. 
In fact, his view aims to lay out why such a demand conflicts with 
communicative rationality.  
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A crucial part of Habermas’s response will involve the idea of performative 
contradictions. A performative contradiction occurs when a speaker must 
presuppose a claim that they intend to argue against. On Habermas’s view, 
the validity of any claim is dependent on willingness to submit that claim to 
challenges, to aim for mutual understanding, and so on. If someone makes a 
claim while unwilling to accept the conditions that their statement’s validity 
depends upon, they are engaged in a performative contradiction. Their 
rejection of justification and mutual understanding means rejecting the 
underlying conditions necessary for making whatever claims they put forward. 
In Habermas’s view, the speaker in Rancière’s example is guilty of such a 
performative contradiction. 
Rancière does not accept this argument. In his rendering, the question 
“Do you understand?” does not involve the presuppositions Habermas 
suggests, but instead presupposes a partition between those who give orders 
and those who follow them, but do not talk back.25 The question assumes a 
police order where the questioner, who need not justify himself or herself, is 
placed above the questioned. Such an ordering of things is what politics 
contests; Rancière is not suggesting that the questioner is in any sense justified 
in presupposing this subordinating division of the social order. He is also not 
simply arguing that power undermines rational communication, given 
powerful actors’ ability to impose constraints on rational discourse.  
Instead, he emphasizes that the situation “forces us to see the scene as 
more complicated, and the response to ‘Do you understand?’ necessarily will 
become more complex.”26 That is, Rancière is pointing out that referencing a 
contradiction in the questioner’s speech has no practical significance in this 
case. The questioner is toying with and aware of the ambiguity of asking the 
question they are posing. They precisely intend to violate and deny the kind 
of pragmatic presuppositions Habermas thinks they are rationally obliged to 
follow. The speaker denies these presuppositions not through a direct validity 
claim, but through an aesthetic partition of the perceptible. They rely on a 
background police logic that depicts the world as a justified hierarchy that fits 
people into certain occupations and activities—without any gaps or fissures.27 
Habermas’s justifications and arguments cannot help the person being 
questioned, because the background police order does not support this 
person’s very right to speak and offer any argumentative response in the first 
place. The person being questioned is depicted as lacking qualification to do 
so. As Russell and Montin suggest, “What is needed from the perspective of 
such disqualified speakers is not a demonstration of the right or requirement 
of access to discourse but a demonstration of how such a right or requirement 
might be made politically effective where its relevance is denied.”28 Habermas, 
Rancière is suggesting, can offer no such demonstration—a philosophical 
theory of communicative action cannot help the person being questioned and 
placed in a subordinate position. 
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It is indeed true that pointing out that someone is engaged in a 
performative contradiction is insufficient to undermine the background 
conditions that allow them to get away with such a contradiction in the first 
place. I am skeptical that this is a deep objection to Habermas’s view, however. 
In outlining a theory of communicative action, Habermas offers a way to 
anchor normative claims in social practice — claims that support rational 
criticism of certain forms of communication. This part of his theory is not a 
manual for holding people accountable for their implicit rational 
commitments. Rancière is rightly indicating that simply pointing out 
performative contradictions falls short of addressing the problem with the 
questioner asking, “Do you understand?” Rancière explains, “the political 
rationality of argument can never be some simple clarification of what 
speaking means.”29 That is true enough, so Habermas’s view will be lacking if 
it stops there. Rather than simple clarification, Rancière offers a picture of the 
way that the excluded must call elements of the lifeworld into question in 
order to resist a particular “police” logic. He explains the importance of 
challenging the contestable background of communication, and gives 
examples of how this process works, in his view.  
Habermas’s pragmatic analysis of communication may not cover these 
issues, although his discussion of problematizing elements of the lifeworld 
certainly gestures in that direction. More importantly, he does not stop with 
an analysis and clarification of communication, nor does he neglect practical 
considerations. In fact, his entire political philosophy offers his view of what it 
takes to move political decision making in the direction of deliberative, 
communicative goals. He theorizes the social conditions for democratic 
decision making, including recognizing the kind of conflicts over equal 
standing and recognition that Rancière alludes to. In one article, Habermas 
defends forms of civil disobedience like occupations, traffic disruptions, and 
blockades as crucial for challenging illegitimate state actions.30 He points, in 
particular, to the importance of such political action from “the downtrodden 
and oppressed who first experience injustice on their own person.”31 Their acts 
of disobedience are especially significant, as they are often best placed to raise 
important issues that would otherwise be swept under the rug. Habermas 
explicitly notes the importance of “struggles for recognition” carried out by 
feminists, cultural minorities, and others.32 In addition to acknowledging the 
significance of such oppositional, democratizing political action, Habermas 
outlines the kind of institutions that would support such a public sphere.33 As 
such, Habermas cannot be plausibly accused of offering an empty, rationalistic 
analysis of political disagreement that ignores the kind of situations Rancière’s 
work points to. 
Rancière does provide a different picture of democratic politics than 
Habermas, which is important to recognize. Whatever we conclude about that 
divergence, Rancière’s case of the person asking, “Do you understand?” does 
not significantly undermine Habermas’s view, which I have shown is fully 
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capable of making sense of that case. Habermas can challenge the validity of 
the speaker’s question, as well as outlining the sort of political system, social 
context, and oppositional politics that would enable a challenge to this 
illegitimate domination. 
Rancière sometimes seems to make an even stronger objection to 
Habermas, beyond suggesting that he cannot offer a way to effectively claim 
one’s equal status through political action. At times, he seems to deny that 
communication involves the presuppositions that Habermas believes it to 
have, presuppositions that allow Habermas to utilize the charge of 
performative contradiction. That would open the possibility that there was 
nothing invalid or irrational about treating some speakers as lacking the 
capacity to communicate with others.34 
Yet there is evidence against this reading of Rancière, whose arguments 
seem to depend on the idea that claims about speakers’ incapacity are invalid. 
The most persuasive interpretation of Rancière’s arguments in Disagreement 
is that politics is about using aesthetic demonstration to pressure dominating 
speakers to give up invalid, contradictory claims about who can speak. 
Dominating speakers’ commitments do not become invalid through the 
demonstration, but are instead revealed as invalid and contradictory. Rancière 
talks in just this manner, speaking of establishing and demonstrating validity 
throughout the text.35 The question, then, is not whether the dominating 
speaker engages in a performative contradiction, but whether Habermas’s 
work can capture the aesthetic demonstration necessary to make that 
contradiction manifest. In the remainder of this paper, I argue that his theory 
is capable of including such demonstrations. 
Aesthetics 
 Before looking at what Habermas might say about such aesthetic 
demonstrations, it is important to note that many have been attracted to 
Rancière’s work by his theorization of the intersection of politics and 
aesthetics. Habermas, by his own admission, has not afforded aesthetics a 
central place in his work, although he has regularly engaged with aesthetic 
theory and developed an approach to it over the years. Rancière, looking at 
the treatment of aesthetics in Habermas’s thought, finds it wanting, 
particularly in political contexts. 
 This is no peripheral criticism, given that Rancière claims that “politics is 
aesthetic in principle.”36 He conceives of political disagreement as 
fundamentally centered on whether speakers are being recognized as 
speakers or if there is agreement on the existence of “the visible object of the 
conflict.”37 Politics, on his definition of it, has to do with what and who appear 
and are obscured in the space of debate, which enables speakers to make 
specific, discursive, and justificatory claims about their interests. Rancière 
argues “that the demonstration proper to politics is always both argument and 
opening up of the world where argument can be received and have an 
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impact.”38 For him, aesthetic expression is not opposed to everyday 
communicative discourse, but can be a demonstration of its necessity. Thus, 
political disagreement is always both aesthetic and rationally argumentative. 
Habermas’s Distinction Between Poetic and Everyday 
Language 
Rancière points out that Habermas separates poetic language from 
“closed-world forms of arguing and validating.”39 That is, language has 
different functions in Habermas’s view: poetically constructing or transforming 
the world of discourse in general or making validity claims within a world. 
What Rancière objects to in this separation is Habermas’s attempt to delineate 
world-disclosing language, which brackets the constraints of everyday speech, 
from normal communicative rationality. His concern is that, in doing so, 
Habermas underplays the sort of political disagreement Rancière privileges, 
setting it off in its own self-referential corner, separated from the 
communicative activity of deliberative democratic politics. If aesthetically and 
rhetorically rich speech is separated from genuine communicative action, then 
the political action that Rancière highlights will not impact everyday speech 
situations. Rancière thinks such a separation cannot do justice to the task 
politics sets out to accomplish through aesthetic expression: challenging the 
logic of the police and its pseudo-consensual presuppositions. 
 Although it is right that Habermas argues for a distinction between 
poetic and everyday language, Rancière overestimates the distinction’s 
importance in addition to the implications that Habermas draws from it. 
Delineating poetic and everyday language does not necessitate a denial of the 
situations Rancière discusses, where aesthetic demonstration opens up the 
space for discourse about political disputes. Habermas merely wants to point 
out that world disclosure and problem solving are two different roles that 
language can have. That is not the same thing as saying that a speech act 
cannot do both things at once. As Thomas McCarthy points out in his 
introduction to Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, “We are dealing here 
with a continuum, no doubt.”40 Still, something can be so poetic or 
metaphorical that it becomes a fiction; a speech act is capable of disengaging 
from the everyday and losing its illocutionary force. However, Habermas is 
pleased to admit that everyday discourses maintain rhetorical elements. He 
does think, however, that they “are tamed, as it were, and enlisted for special 
purposes of problem solving.”41 This kind of enlistment of the aesthetic, 
rhetorical, and poetic can be used to capture Rancière’s examples of political 
disagreement, even if Habermas ultimately gestures at a different 
interpretation of them.  
For Habermas, the rationality of these political interventions comes from 
the fact that the force of protest is not merely aesthetic. Rather than being 
“overdetermined” by some kind of autonomous aesthetic context, Rancière’s 
examples depict “deficient solutions to problems and invalid answers.”42 In 
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these cases, agents are faced with a lifeworld that erases them and their 
problems, which they respond to with demonstrations that aim to challenge 
the police order. If these aesthetic demonstrations are to have communicative 
force, they relate to something we can say yes or no to, either an answer to or 
the positing of a problem or question. They thematize problems in the 
lifeworld (exclusions, undemocratic status relations, etc.) that can be 
recognized or ignored. The response to these expressions must be subject to 
validation, not mere arbitrary decision making. As a result, Habermas’s 
understanding of politics can, when appropriate, view aesthetic concerns as 
integrated with everyday communication. 
Can Habermas Plausibly Interpret Rancière’s Central Cases? 
Elsewhere, Habermas discusses aesthetic validity in terms that enable him 
to offer an interpretation of the cases that Rancière suggests undermine 
Habermas’s view. In response to questions about his understanding of modern 
art, Habermas suggests that “[art] reaches into our cognitive interpretations 
and normative expectations and transforms the totality in which these 
moments are related to each other.”43 Habermas adds that aesthetic validity 
has the “singularly illuminating power to open our eyes to what is seemingly 
familiar, to disclose anew an apparently familiar reality.”44 Moreover, he 
doesn’t believe that art makes a singular validity claim, as with discursive 
statements about the objective world, intersubjective moral obligation, or 
first-person, subjective statements. Instead, Habermas believes that art 
intermeshes these claims together. In considering the transformative aesthetic 
expression that Rancière depicts, which exposes and reshapes the background 
of everyday political discourse, Habermas can rely on the aesthetic theory 
sketched in these remarks. What Habermas says about art can apply to 
political action with aesthetic significance. Habermas conceives of aesthetic 
expression as a complex sort of validity claim, not merely strategic action or 
self-referential, fictionalized world-building. Instead, on his view, aesthetic 
activity has an impact on everyday communication and can be subject to the 
sort of intersubjective discursive evaluation his theory emphasizes. 
Rancière, given his understanding of how fundamental aesthetics and 
perception are in these examples, may not accept the readings Habermas 
would offer of these sorts of cases. In the acts of resistance that Rancière 
analyzes, he believes different “regimes of expression” or “partition[s] of the 
perceptible” come into conflict.45 These conflicts are not about normal rational 
validity claims, but a kind of prior community of sensation, which Rancière 
believes is opened up and challenged in the examples he describes. 
Specifically, the presuppositions about the situation of speech—especially 
which subjects are involved and what authority they enjoy—are being 
disputed. The dispute is over whether a common world of speech and 
communication must be presupposed in order to give orders and coordinate 
action. One aesthetic regime excludes some people as having no capacity to 
participate, while the one that emerges shows that the exclusionary police 
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regime can be contested and that a common stage of debate is possible. 
When someone is treated as though they cannot reasonably speak in a 
situation, they can ignore that, comment on it, and demonstrate their capacity 
for speech through speaking about the situation.  
There are still questions here about how much of a challenge to Habermas 
these claims actually support, though. As I have suggested, the critique of 
Habermas cannot simply be that Rancière acknowledges the aesthetic 
character of presuppositions about the speech situation, while Habermas 
cannot recognize them or support related acts of political disagreement. 
Habermas does discuss aesthetic validity in his work, which allows him to deal 
with Rancière’s examples of contestation over what is assumed in contexts of 
speech.  
One reading of Rancière might suggest the concern is that Habermas’s 
discussions of world disclosure do not capture how political disagreement 
involves two completely opposed distributions of the sensible. On this view, 
politics involves separate, irreconcilable worlds coming into conflict. There is 
some textual evidence for this reading of Rancière, such as his claim that 
“politics […] is made up of relationships between worlds.”46 If a world is 
understood as a distinct, separate order of things, then Habermas’s discussion 
of world disclosure may not be adequate for capturing the phenomenon 
Rancière is focused on. On this view, the world introduced in opposition to the 
dominant one would not just be the partial critique of a shared lifeworld, but 
a completely different regime of sense, another world entirely. Political 
disagreement would not just be about making something visible or sayable, 
but about aesthetically introducing a new, egalitarian world to replace the old 
police order being contested.  
As Axel Honneth argues, however, if Rancière takes this position, he will 
be presenting worlds as overly “rigid” structures, immune to “new 
interpretations and appropriations.”47 Moreover, if worlds are interpreted so 
separately and rigidly, then Rancière will be depicting political actors as lacking 
shared background commitments. As I explained previously, this stance lacks 
plausibility. Critique cannot proceed by presenting alternative pictures of the 
world aimed at rejecting entire collective ways of life. Instead, it must take 
place within a shared lifeworld, focused on particular aspects of it.  
In fact, Rancière does not describe different “worlds” as fully separate and 
unable to influence one another. He does not present people choosing 
between world A and world B, but often proceeds as though alternative visions 
of the world operate to reshape individuals’ relationship to everyday life. 
Aesthetic transformations do not pull people out of the everyday order of 
things into a new one; such transformations change people’s relationship to 
themselves and to everyday existence. In Proletarian Nights, for instance, 
Rancière presents the discourses of workers engaged in the Saint-Simonian 
movement, as well as in poetry, literature, and philosophy. In looking at the 
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ways the worlds of labor and cultural life intersect, Rancière does not depict 
two disconnected worlds, one of which wholly involves the rejection of the 
other. Instead, he alludes to experiences of the worlds of Saint-Simonianism 
and art outside the workshop as enabling workers’ judgments, “revelation[s] 
of self,” “passions,” and “desires for another world.”48 At times, his descriptions 
somewhat resemble Habermas’s discussions of the illuminating power of 
aesthetic experience. Neither the aesthetic order of work nor the order of 
cultural experience operate in any sort of pure, separate way—as the kind of 
rigid thing that Honneth warns against. These aesthetic sensibilities intermix 
in messy ways in the lives of individuals, as well as within political movements.  
In critiquing Habermas, then, Rancière should not be read as taking such 
a rigid position. Instead he might suggest that within a shared lifeworld, 
different, opposed ways of making sense of the speech situation, which have 
an aesthetic character, come into conflict in political disagreement. His use of 
the word “reconfiguring” gestures in this direction.49 Perhaps it is this dynamic 
within the lifeworld that Habermas cannot capture. As Steven Corcoran puts 
it, explaining Rancière’s critique, Habermas wrongly “presupposes precisely 
that the existence of the interlocuters is pre-established, their identity and 
interests discerned.”50 Rancière believes that the nature and existence of those 
engaged in disputes is precisely what is under dispute. Disagreement in 
politics, he thinks, is about the aesthetic presuppositions of the interlocuters. 
This implies that Rancière conceives two regimes of sense that come into 
conflict within a lifeworld, one that presupposes an egalitarian speech 
situation and one that denies it. The latter does not accept the competence 
and capability of some individuals or groups. Aesthetic demonstration is the 
key to contesting this state of affairs and reconfiguring the interests, identities, 
and context involved in the dispute. Perhaps appeals to communicative 
rationality make such discussions and demonstrations impossible by locking 
identities and interests in place. 
If Rancière is making this criticism, though, then it is even less clear why 
Habermasians should abandon their approach. Habermas does not assume 
predefined identities and interests for those who communicate. These 
elements of social life are explicitly considered matters of political dispute; 
communicative discourse is supposed to enable reflection and critique about 
these matters, as well as radical changes to them. In Habermas’s treatments of 
these issues, he speaks of the articulation, construction, reinterpretation, and 
transformation of identities and interests in politics. For instance, he describes 
feminism as aiming to change “the relationship between the sexes along with 
the collective identity of women, thereby directly affecting men’s 
understanding of themselves as well.”51 He suggests its success would mean 
transfiguring overall social, as well as personal, values. Habermas also says 
nothing to deny that these processes can involve aesthetic forms of 
expression. 
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In general, though, Habermas will reject against any contention that 
partitions of the perceptible, identities, interests, and reconfigurations of them 
cannot be subject to intersubjective validation in discourse. He will push back 
against suggestions that these ways of making sense are not subject to 
discursive legitimation and challenge, insofar as Rancière or his supporters 
take such a stance. When Rancière discusses these cases, though, he seems to 
be suggesting a fusion of discursive validity claims and aesthetic, rhetorical 
impacts that reconfigure how we see the world. He says, for instance, that “the 
‘poetic’ is not opposed here to argument.”52 The force of argument cannot be 
left out of the treatment of these cases, then. While Rancière’s view of the 
relation between aesthetics and discourse differs from Habermas’s, his 
arguments and examples do not provide reasons for Habermasians to 
abandon discourse theoretic frameworks.  
Habermas on Consensus 
Habermas does, however, utilize consensus in his theory as the goal of 
communicative action, which leads some to think that oppositional, 
aesthetically-charged political action of the sort in Rancière’s work has no 
place in Habermas’s conception of politics. Rancière emphasizes cases where 
dissensus leads to a radical rejection of the status quo, while “consensus 
consists, then, in the reduction of politics to the police.”53 Consensus, on this 
view, would be a social order without remainder—a static, rigid framework 
constraining everyday life. Such a situation would eliminate the political 
resistance at the heart of Rancière’s thought. As I have indicated, Habermas’s 
conception of politics is far from such a stultified picture of things. He does 
defend democratic constitutionalism and public justification, but these 
commitments support a great deal of just the sort of political upheaval 
Rancière emphasizes. In his theory, discourse—including aesthetic expression 
in politics—gains its significance from being part of attempts to act and 
coordinate action in the world. For Habermas, these attempts may often fail, 
but raucous political action is understood as part of a process of democratic 
consensus formation. Aiming at consensus does not preclude disagreement—
democratic discourse may often begin with clarifying disagreement and 
fighting against the exclusion of some from political life. Habermasian 
communicative rationality, even in its orientation toward consensus, is far 
more flexible than this critique suggests. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether Habermas is offering an all-
things-considered, workable theory of aesthetics. There is certainly room for 
debate about whether Habermas’s approach to aesthetic theory constitutes 
an adequate treatment of these issues—and many have raised questions on 
that count.54 Whether he can resolve difficult questions about art and aesthetic 
experience’s relation to everyday life, rationality, and politics ought to be the 
subject of ongoing discussion. Theorists influenced by Habermas will continue 
to offer amendments to and extensions of his theory of communicative action 
in an attempt to adequately capture matters of aesthetics. While those issues 
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cannot be fully settled here, the question of whether Rancière’s attack on 
Habermas’s aesthetics succeeds can be. The distinctions and commitments in 
Habermas’s theory to which Rancière points do not prevent Habermas from 
capturing the sort of cases Rancière explores in his work.  
Conclusion 
Even if Habermasians should not ignore Rancière’s approach to political 
action, I have argued that his critique does not undermine Habermas’s political 
philosophy, nor does it strike at the heart of Habermas’s conception of 
democratic politics. Habermasians should not abandon discourse democracy 
in response to Rancière’s objections related to third-person speech, 
understanding, and aesthetics. A closer reading of Habermas’s views, which I 
have provided here, reveals that these objections fail. 
In conclusion, I want to note some of the reasons why—despite the 
richness of Rancière’s work and his strongly held democratic commitments—
Habermasians and other Frankfurt School theorists have reason to resist the 
core of Rancière’s approach. By sketching these concerns, I do not intend to 
deny that there are philosophical and methodological disputes worth having 
between these parties. I do, however, hope to gesture at some of the elements 
of Rancière’s work Habermasians are likely to push back against or reject.  
In particular, the abstract, negative approach to actually existing 
institutions in Rancière’s thought stands fundamentally opposed to 
Habermasian commitments. Rancière’s avoidance of exploring what sort of 
positive social and political order we ought to pursue is compounded by an 
evasion of systematic investigation of the normative grounds of critique, 
focusing instead on a description of politics. 
The abstract orientation of Rancière’s work resists making the kind of 
concrete judgments about normative orders that critical theorists have long 
strived to make. Rancière acknowledges the fact that the differences between 
various forms of what he calls the “police” matter, noting “the police can 
procure all sorts of good, and one police may be infinitely preferable to 
another.”55 Nonetheless, his conceptual framing considers decent and good 
social orders to still fall within the police category, meaning that he views them 
as fundamentally opposed to politics. This stance is part of what prompts 
Honneth’s previously discussed critique that Rancière’s depiction of social and 
political orders makes them appear overly fixed and closed off.56 Even if 
Rancière acknowledges the importance of distinctions between police, he 
does not offer a full-fledged theoretical analysis of these distinctions. This 
focus is in response to what he sees as social and philosophical trends that 
ignore and undermine his conception of politics. Nonetheless, James Ingram, 
summarizing the critiques of Jodi Dean, Anita Chari, and Lois McNay, suggests 
that “by restricting politics to the disruption of other social spheres and logics 
while refusing to engage with their substance and specificity, Rancière is left 
with little critical purchase on society—or for that matter on politics.”57 The 
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lack of an analysis of the manifold possibilities for such police orders means 
that important aspects of political action, including its aims with respect to the 
social order, will elude Rancière’s theoretical approach. Unlike Habermas, 
Rancière will offer no picture of or commitment to democratic political 
institutions, which are ruled out as a contradiction in terms from the start. 
An element of this gap that will be especially concerning to Frankfurt 
School theorists like Habermas is Rancière’s avoidance of social science and 
social theory in his work, dismissing reliance on it as metapolitics. He objects 
to Marx and others for viewing politics as a kind of falsity that obscures the 
genuine social reality “beneath or behind it.”58 In part to avoid the potential 
reductionism of such approaches, Rancière expresses a suspiciousness of 
social scientific analysis that threatens to usurp the voice of political actors. 
Engagement with and production of such social theory and knowledge has 
long been a feature of Frankfurt School theory, including Habermas’s work. 
While the worries Rancière has about concealing genuine politics are well 
founded, those within the Frankfurt School tradition will view him as 
neglecting the generative, crucial role of social science in thinking about 
politics. Gaining a picture of “the political” in general does not offer the 
resources necessary to understand whether those who are subordinated are 
positioned to undertake political action. As Lois McNay argues: 
Political agency is not a capacity that is evenly distributed across all 
subordinated groups. In fact, by failing to take up the issue of power 
in a more nuanced way, Ranciere’s all-or-nothing logic perpetuates 
the powerlessness of the disempowered by confining them to 
perpetual marginality.59 
McNay is pointing out that social knowledge is crucial for getting a grip 
on various social positions, including marginalized ones, and asking what 
obstacles might restrict political action. As she rightly points out, Rancière’s 
reticence about such social analysis is not just meant to resist reductionism, 
but comes from a cautiousness about replacing the voices of the dominated 
with the voices of the theorist or the social scientist. He does not want to speak 
on behalf of others, treating them as unequal. But McNay rightly emphasizes 
that it is possible to speak about someone else without claiming to 
condescendingly speak for them, even if one must be vigilant against sliding 
into the latter mode. Rancière ignores this distinction and denies himself 
resources Habermas and many others find crucial in their approach to politics 
and society. While Habermasians and others would do well to heed Rancière’s 
caution in this regard, Rancière’s overly zealous application of this caution 
undermines the overall power of his view. 
Within the broadly Habermasian critical theoretic paradigm, there is a 
great deal of room for disagreement about what sort of positive political order 
we ought to pursue, as well as how we ought to normatively and theoretically 
ground such institutional claims. Discussions between Habermas and thinkers 
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like Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, Rainer Forst, and many others working within 
the Frankfurt School paradigm exemplify the ongoing debates about these 
matters. Amongst these thinkers, there have been many important objections, 
amendments, and reimaginings of the sort of approach that Habermas 
pioneered. Rancière’s approach forecloses much of this discourse without 
offering an attractive alternative by the lights of most of those influenced by 
Habermas or working within the Frankfurt School tradition.  
The differing starting points of Rancière and those in the Frankfurt School 
can make it hard to find common theoretical ground, despite sharing strong 
commitments to democracy and equality. If Rancière’s objections were 
sufficient to undermine Habermas, then those working within the discourse 
theory of democracy would have reason to rethink their theoretical 
foundations and consider taking up a view like Rancière’s. As I have argued, 
however, Rancière’s criticisms miss the mark. Not only that, but Rancière 
constrains himself in ways that raise concerns about his approach. 
Nonetheless, his attention to aesthetic issues in politics, his devotion to 
equality, and his scrutiny of exclusionary social orders offer important 
examples for other theorists to draw on. Habermasians and others would do 
well to more carefully consider the kinds of cases that Rancière is most 
sensitive to. While these elements of his view and others are worthy of careful 
attention, he has failed to give Habermasians a reason to abandon the body 
of work they have developed and adopt his theories instead. To do so, I have 
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